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1. Introduction 
The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI remains one of the unsettled 
concepts in public finance. The importance of tax incentives in attraction of 
internationally mobile capital differs with the jurisdiction of the study and the 
methodology used in drawing conclusions. Feld & Heckemeyer (2009) argue that the 
impact of tax differentials on multinational locational decisions remains insufficiently 
analysed. They conclude that qualitative survey analysis gives less convincing results hence 
most economists have resorted to econometric analysis. The methodology of the study is 
thus critical in the analysis of empirical studies. 
In this paper the study seeks to make an inquest into the underlying theory on tax 
incentives’ effectiveness in attracting FDI, with special interest in theory that is used to 
justify the use of tax incentives. The empirical findings of the studies on tax incentives for 
FDI attraction will also be explored with the view to establishing conclusions on the 
importance of tax incentives and also building the basis of the model this study is going to 
use. 
Tax incentives have various definitions; Bolnick (2004) defines tax incentives as fiscal 
measures used by governments to attract investment domestically and internationally in 
certain key sectors of the economy. Zee, Stosky, & Ley (2002) defines tax incentives in 
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statutory and effective terms. A statutory tax incentive is a special tax provision granted to 
qualifying investment projects and this provision would not be applied to other 
investment projects outside the selected qualifying categories. An effective tax incentive is 
a special tax provision granted to qualifying investment projects with the goal of reducing 
the effective tax burden.  
A thorough review of the literature on the economics of tax incentives, tax competition 
and harmonisation will help in understanding, firstly, whether tax incentives are or are not 
the most important factor in attraction of foreign investment; secondly, what kind of 
foreign investors are likely to be most responsive to changes in tax policy and which 
methodology gives more convincing results since these areas have retained the attention 
of many researchers over the years (see Yelpaala, 1985; Rendon-Garza, 2006; & Sato, 
2012). The chapter will highlight the major ideas from international research to help the 
study to identify the gaps that still need to be filled in the SADC region. The aim of this 
research is thus to establish the harmony between theory and empirical evidence in 
explaining the attraction of foreign mobile capital.  
The rest of the research is organised as follows: section 2 briefly look with the rationale 
for introducing tax incentives, section 3 deal with theoretical arguments for introducing 
tax incentives, section 4 discuss the case for and against tax incentives, section 5 deal with 
tax competition and harmonisation, section 6 move to the empirical analysis of findings 
on the effectiveness of tax incentives before the chapter conclusion in section 7. 
2. Rationale for introducing tax incentives 
Zee et al. (2001) define tax incentives in terms of their effect on reducing the effective tax 
burden for a specific project. Standard international tax policy endorses caution against the 
use of tax incentives for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Klemm, 2009).  
However, tax incentives have remained a popular policy tool for attracting FDI in 
developed, transitional and developing countries. Wilson (1999) argues that given the 
assumption of perfectly mobile capital, when a given government raises its tax rate, net 
return on capital located there falls and capital chooses to relocate elsewhere. Wilson’s 
(1999) conclusions therefore support the use of tax incentives in reducing tax rates and 
attracting FDI. 
Tiebout (1956) in Onyeiwu & Shrestha (2005) conclude that the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in attracting FDI depends on the tax incentives and public goods provision mix 
in the host nation. Typically FDI location favours nations with the highest public goods 
provision and lowest tax burden mix. This conclusion takes a balanced budget approach in 
analysing the effectiveness of a tax system where taxes are assumed to be the key source of 
government revenue in public goods provision. Reduction in tax revenue through 
introduction of tax incentives might compromise public goods provision thus the 
government should seek to optimise the trade-off between public goods provision and 
loss in revenue due to tax incentives.  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2001) notes 
that governments employ taxation for various political and policy objectives; however, it 
should be mentioned that the major objectives of tax reforms and restructuring have been 
more similar in many economies. The tax systems across the world have been designed to 
achieve a stable revenue base, to better income distribution and to improve national 
resource allocation. Tax incentives fall in the broad category of governments tax systems, 
thus they are expected to achieve similar objectives, apart from attracting internationally 
mobile capital. Developing countries offer tax incentives for a variety of reasons, chief 
amongst them being to counter the negative effects of a bad tax system (Holland & Vann 
1998). Most developing countries have poor tax administration structures which 
inconvenience businesses and also lead to massive revenue losses due to tax evasion and 
tax avoidance. 
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Tax incentives are also used to counterweight the effects of poor macroeconomics, poor 
infrastructure and a lack of effective institutions in developing nations, which increase the 
cost of doing business. Thus reducing tax rates will help to cover the losses made by 
investors. The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI is a highly debatable issue 
with a number of studies finding non-tax factors more effective than tax incentives 
(Onyeiwu & Shrestha, 2005; Bolnick, 2004;  Sudsawasd, 2008), and others view fiscal 
incentives as central to FDI attraction (Hassett & Hubbard, 2002; Sato, 2012). However, 
governments over the years have made wide use of tax incentives to compete for 
internationally mobile capital. 
James (2010) points out that policy makers employ both tax and non-tax incentives to lure 
investment across their borders. He also concludes that the economy’s investment climate 
is critical to the effectiveness of tax incentives.  James (2010) defines tax incentives as 
those tax reduction treatments offered to foreign investments and not to domestic 
investments with the view to attracting FDI. Tax incentives increase the after-tax profits 
on investments and generally an investor will prefer a location with a lower tax liability in 
cases where locations have similar resource characteristics (Owens, 2004). Thus, tax 
competition has dominated the justification for use of tax incentives over the years where 
neighbouring nations seek to out-do one another in FDI attraction through lowering tax 
rates.  
Tax incentives are also used to signal ease of doing business in a country as they reduce 
barriers to FDI location and indicate the host nation’s level of acceptance of foreign 
players in markets where incentives are instituted. The major theoretical foundation for 
this chapter is that all fiscal incentives will have an impact on the cost of capital, effective 
tax rates and, ultimately, on where FDI locates.  Holland & Vann (1998) argue that 
regional development is also a common objective for the use of tax incentives. Thus, this 
chapter will also explain how regional blocks use taxes and tax harmonisation to bring 
development to their regions.  
3. Theoretical arguments for introducing tax incentives 
3.1 Early theoretical arguments for introduction of tax incentives 
Early economic development theorists of the neoclassical era established the importance 
of capital formation on economic growth (Jorgenson, 1963; Fei & Ranis, 1961). 
Neoclassical theorists in their quest to reincarnate classical economics were the earliest 
theorists to explain the link between (tax) incentives and the attraction of internationally 
mobile capital. This section will discuss the theories that support the use of tax incentives 
to attract capital. 
The capital arbitrage theory, the neoclassical investment theory,                                      
the neoclassical OLI theory and Intangible assets theory 
The capital arbitrage theory of international capital movement which originated from the 
neoclassical international trade theory argues that capital movement responds to the 
differentials in rates of return (Yelpaala, 1985). Hence the theory identifies a strong causal 
link between tax incentives and FDI location. The theory established that capital will move 
from capital-rich countries to capital-scarce countries in search of higher returns and the 
process will continue until the returns on capital are equalised between jurisdictions.  
The owners of internationally mobile capital act as arbitragers and move their capital in 
pursuit of highest returns given the risk associated with the investment. The capital 
arbitrage theory is used to explain the location of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in 
developing countries where capital is scarce. Normally capital-scarce locations have high 
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unemployment rates and thus provide cheap labour which further enhances the profits 
from locating capital in such regions. 
Jorgenson (1963) introduced the neoclassical investment theory which suggests that firms 
will continue to accumulate capital as long as the costs of doing so are less than the 
benefits. Since firms experience decreasing returns from additional capital, they will stop 
when the present value of returns from capital equals the present value of costs. 
Since the before-tax rate of return on capital is viewed as a cost of capital, lower tax rates 
reduce the cost of capital and increase the investment in more capital stock (Van Parys & 
James, 2010). The neoclassical investment theory thus suggests that tax incentives 
encourage growth of established firms through reinvestments and also lures new 
investments since it reduces the cost of capital. 
Dunning (1988) developed the OLI theory also termed the ‘eclectic paradigm of 
investment’. The theory explains how firms choose foreign markets to establish their 
businesses. The study concludes that firms choose locational destinations based on three 
factors: ownership (O), location (L) and internalisation (I). 
Tavares-Lehmann, Coelho, & Lehmann (2012) classify tax incentives under the locational 
advantages of a host nation in attraction of FDI. Hence tax incentives increase the host 
country’s attractiveness to investment if they lower tax rates below the investor’s home 
country tax rates or if they lower tax rates below those of other competing destinations. 
Devereux (2006) in Tavares-Lehmann et al. (2012) conducted a study on the analysis of 
empirical evidence on the effects of taxation on investment location decisions of MNEs 
and concludes that taxation plays a role in affecting MNEs’ choices; however, taxes were 
found not to be equally important in all MNEs’ locational decisions. Efficiency-seeking 
FDI was found to be more responsive to tax incentives than resource-seeking FDI. 
Hirsch (1976) in Yelpaala (1985) argues that the costs of the business operation are vital in 
FDI location decisions. The major conclusion of the theory is that FDI takes place as long 
as there are positive gains from investing in intangible assets in a host country after 
factoring in all the costs of operation. Tax incentives lower the operational costs of firms 
and thus encourage foreign investors to invest in more capital. 
3.2 Modern theoretical arguments for tax incentives 
Earlier theories on the justification of tax incentives were probed and the conclusions 
deemed the arguments to be inappropriate (Yelpaala, 1985). However, tax incentives 
remain a  key policy tool used by governments to lure investment and policy makers have 
based their justifications on factors that are different  from  the earlier theories. The new 
arguments will form the modern theoretical arguments which will be discussed in this 
section. 
New economic geography (NEG) theory, policy                                                                
arguments and Economic arguments 
The NEG theory was built on the neoclassical investment theory which concludes that 
there is a direct positive relationship between lowered tax rates and increased investment 
(Van Parys & James, 2010). The model introduces the concept of core-periphery. This 
concept suggests that business concentration reinforces itself and thus the world is left 
with a core region that attracts the most FDI. 
NEG models emphasize the role of business concentration that is self-reinforcing leaving 
the world with a core region. Devereux, Griffith, & Simpson (2007) support the theory 
with their findings that lower tax rates are more effective in regions that already have more 
investment. 
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This model has however, also been used to discourage FDI attraction through lowering 
tax rates in regions outside the core region. This is because FDI will locate in regions 
where they find many other firms even if those regions have higher tax rates. 
As noted by the OECD (2001) report entitled ‘Corporate tax incentives for FDI’, tax 
incentives are introduced by many developed, transitional and developing countries with 
the aim of achieving international competitiveness, addressing market failures, boosting 
regional development and improving income distribution. Low corporate taxes increase 
FDI flows by attracting new investors, retaining existing investors and encouraging 
reinvestments of returns accrued by existing enterprises (Onyeiwu & Shrestha, 2005).   
International competitiveness tax incentives are regarded as a strong factor in attracting 
internationally mobile capital, encouraging research and development initiatives by 
multinational companies and improving the competitiveness of the export sector of the 
host nation (OECD, 2001). Thus, tax incentives are viewed as critical in the locational 
decisions of the multinational companies. Tax incentives act as a relief to locational costs 
of foreign business and increase the competitiveness of an economy against other 
neighbouring jurisdictions with similar locational factors.  
The market mechanism is inherently socially suboptimal, thus tax incentives are also used 
in instances where socially optimal investment has not been achieved by the market system 
(OECD, 2001). In this case, tax incentives are used as government intervention 
mechanisms in achieving socially acceptable investment levels. Due to the positive 
externalities characterising investment, the private sector normally under-produces 
investment, hence the socially desirable level of investment is established through 
government intervention in the form of subsidies and tax incentives. Tax incentives are 
also used by economic regional groupings to address the regional unemployment and 
poverty problems. OECD (2001) notes that tax incentives are also important in improving 
the host nation’s macro-economy. By moving investment into their countries, nations 
reduce the problems of cyclical unemployment, balance-of-payments (BOP) deficits and, 
in some cases, help to control inflation.  
The use of tax incentives has grown since the 1990s due to a number of world economic 
changes such as globalisation and the creation of common markets (Owens, 2004). The 
process of globalisation has increased competition and establishment of production units 
in different locations has increased the amount of internationally mobile capital which can 
be lured into different locations through the use of tax incentives (Owens, 2004). The 
creation of common markets through economic integration has reduced the difference 
between market-oriented and export-oriented FDI. Reduced tariffs have reduced the costs 
of importing and exporting (Owens, 2004). This has created a situation where foreign 
investment chooses a single location. Thus, tax incentives can lure the investors to a 
preferred destination and supply to markets that do not offer investment incentives but 
share a common market and common tariffs with the preferred location. 
4. Merits and demerits of tax incentives 
Easson & Zolt (2002) conclude that it is common knowledge that tax incentives for FDI 
are both bad in theory and in practice. Theoretically they find tax incentives bad since they 
distort investment decisions. Practically, tax incentives are deemed to be ineffective and 
prone to corruption thus the conclusion that they are bad (Easson & Zolt, 2002). 
However, almost all countries continue to use them for a number of reasons thus in this 
section the study will explore the merits and demerits of tax incentives. Bird (1993) 
suggests that, "Tax incentives improve economic performance only if government officials 
are better able to decide the best types and means of production for an economy than 
private investors." 
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4.1 Merits of tax incentives 
Correcting market failure 
Bird (1993) argues that governments have a role to play in achieving a socially desirable 
socio-economic environment using a variety of tools including taxation. Taxes are used by 
governments for redistribution of income, efficient allocation of resources and to raise 
revenue for government operations. Most taxes distort the economic conditions; income 
taxes reduce returns on factors of production; import taxes distort the level of imports and 
exports and consumption taxes distort expenditure (Easson & Zolt, 2002). 
Governments use taxes to correct market failures. For example, tax incentives are used to 
correct under-production of investment activities by the private sector and thus generate 
positive externalities (Easson & Zolt, 2002). Governments will seek to correct investment 
decisions of the private sector using tax incentives and harness investment that would 
have not occurred without tax incentives. This is because governments want the economy 
to enjoy the benefits of foreign capital which include technological transfer, skills transfer, 
employment creation and economic growth and development.  
Externalities 
There are investments that create positive externalities which benefit the overall economy 
and governments need to support such activities. These activities include new technology 
investments, infrastructural development, and environmentally friendly technology (James, 
2009). New technology development in production opens opportunities for other firms in 
the same industry to adopt the same new ways of production which improves the 
economy’s overall performance. Infrastructural development has a positive spill-over 
effect due to the public good nature of infrastructure, thus investment in infrastructure 
benefits the whole economy. Environmentally friendly investments which create a clean 
environment have positive externalities due to the public good nature of a clean 
environment which is non-excludable to all citizens of an economy. 
Investments which bear positive externalities thus benefit the overall economy and should 
be encouraged through tax incentives. 
Tax competition 
Tax incentives may be used by countries to increase their revenue base by improving their 
competitiveness (Klemm, 2009). This is useful in countries that wish to attract mobile 
capital but face revenue constraints. Countries will offer tax incentives to mobile capital 
and attract investment while getting revenue by taxing existing capital and immobile 
capital.  
4.2 Demerits of tax incentives  
Revenue loss 
Easson & Zolt (2002) identify two sources of revenue loss due to tax incentives. Firstly, 
tax incentives discourage other investments in favour of the incentive-receiving projects 
hence revenue is lost from the foregone projects. Secondly, revenue is lost since 
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businesses will improperly claim incentives and in some instances shift income from 
taxable activities to those that fall under tax incentives thereby avoiding tax. 
Misallocation of resources 
The success of tax incentive policies means that investment will increase in regions and 
nations within the successful incentive structures thus reducing investment in those that 
do not have the incentives (Bird, 1993). This increase in investment due to tax incentives 
in some cases will correct market failures while in most instances it may lead to too much 
investment in activities that have incentives and reduced investment in those activities 
without incentives, thereby leading to misallocation of resources. 
Enforcement and compliance challenges 
Government tax provision comes with associated costs in enforcing the tax laws and 
ensuring that parties comply. Easson & Zolt (2002) suggest that tax incentives are difficult 
to administer and enforce which leads to huge losses in revenue to governments that 
operate them. 
Encourages corruption 
Tax incentives give bureaucrats the opportunity to engage in corrupt and rent-seeking 
activities (Easson & Zolt, 2002). This is prevalent in cases where tax incentives give the 
authorities discretion to determine which projects qualify for incentives and which do not. 
Tanzi (1998) suggests that corruption is high with tax incentives, due to direct links 
between investors and government authorities who use their discretion in implementing 
tax incentives. 
The empirical findings by Zelekha & Sharabi (2012) show that tax incentives lead to 
significant corruption. The study employed a large cross-section of European countries 
and two-stage least square analysis to reach the conclusion. 
5. Tax competition and harmonisation 
Alfano (2001) defines tax competition as actions by countries in reducing their tax bases in 
response to other countries’ reduction in tax bases. Wilson & Wildasin (2004) define tax 
competition as a non-cooperative game, in which countries set tax rate policies in a bid to 
influence the location of internationally mobile capital. Tax competition can thus be 
considered as government’s deliberate reduction in the domestic tax rates for specific 
economic activities by foreigners with the sole purpose of attracting foreign mobile capital 
and to boost economic activity (Rendon-Garza, 2006).  
Tax competition can be categorised as regional or global competition. Regional tax 
competition is competition amongst countries in close geographical proximity and global 
tax competition extends to competition for capital that can locate anywhere in the world 
(Rendon-Garza, 2006). Where nations discover that the overall welfare of their nationals is 
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being compromised due to tax competition, they collaborate in setting tax systems and 
uniform tax rates; this is tax harmonisation and it is common in most regional states. 
5.1 Theories of tax competition 
Tiebout, Oates and the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowski model 
The earliest work on tax competition was coined by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972). The 
model was formally modelled by Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). The 
theory’s main thrust is that tax competition amongst regional countries leads to 
inefficiencies in government expenditure and taxation. 
The origin of the theory of tax competition comes from Tiebout’s (1956) theory of 
federalism and is also termed the ‘theory of efficient tax competition’. The theory is rooted 
in the competition amongst jurisdictions for households given efficient provision of public 
goods (Rendon-Garza,  2006). Tiebout’s (1956) model identifies the fact that with 
households voting with their feet and locating where there is an efficient trade-off between 
public goods provision and taxation, jurisdictions end up with inefficient taxation mixes in 
their quest to attract more households. This model was then extended to the location of 
firms by White (1975), Fischel (1975) and Wellisch (2000) with similar conclusions to the 
original Tiebout (1956) model that firms favour locating to where there are lower tax rates.  
The Tiebout (1956) model’s extension to mobile firms’ locational decisions was 
formulated in the same way as that for mobile residents. The model assumes that firms are 
in infinite elastic supply to each country and each country supplies firms with public inputs 
into their production functions. Each firm is taxed using the marginality principle where 
marginal tax should equal the marginal cost of providing the firm with public inputs which 
constitutes public goods (Wilson, 1986). Therefore, the models found that under the 
Pareto efficiency principle, tax competition leads to efficiency since marginal benefits from 
public goods provision is equalised to the marginal cost of paying taxes.  
Rendon-Garza (2006) points out that the effectiveness of the Tiebout model in explaining 
FDI location is highly constrained by its simplifying assumptions. The first restrictive 
assumption is that government can institute a fair tax on each individual which is equal to 
the cost of providing the individual with his/her preferred public good. The assumption is 
unrealistic in the attraction of investing firms since they favour taxes which give them 
competitive advantage over existing local firms. This is because foreign firms find it 
difficult to compete with local firms which have easy access to their local markets for 
inputs and sales; thus they require lower production costs in the form of lower taxes. 
The second assumption of the classical Tiebout model is that there are no economies of 
scale in public goods production and the third is that there are a large number of 
jurisdictional authorities or countries meant to achieve an efficient sorting of individuals. 
The second assumption contradicts economic theory which has identified that provision 
of public good requires a large capital set-up which in the long-run creates economies of 
scale. The third assumption makes the model difficult to apply to the concept of FDI 
location competition since most regional economies are made up of a small number of 
countries. 
The fact that the location of internationally mobile capital requires taxation that favours 
certain activities over others makes the analysis of tax competition more relevant in the 
analysis of FDI locational decision. The departure from the principles that lead to efficient 
tax setting in the Tiebout model means that tax competition in FDI attraction leads to 
fiscal externalities amongst competing economies (Rendon-Garza, 2006). The effect of 
these externalities is the basis of the modern analysis of tax competition. 
Oates (1972) extends the Tiebout (1956) model but concludes that the use of tax 
competition can lead to inefficient provision of public goods. This emanates from the fact 
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that in a bid to attract investment authorities will keep tax rates at low levels. This low 
taxation may lead to authorities providing inefficient levels of public services due to funds 
constraints. 
Oates (1972) argues that if the business offered a low tax rate does not confer social 
benefits, the social inefficiency of tax incentives will be large. This is because tax 
competition leads to low wages; low employment; capital losses on homes and reduced tax 
base (Oates, 1972). The conclusion of welfare loss due to taxation in Oates’ (1972) theory 
emanates from the fact that, when all governments lower their tax rates in a bid to attract 
internationally mobile capital, no one benefits from the competitive advantage and thus 
the resultant resource allocation will be sub-optimal (Wilson, 1999). 
Thus, the origin of the modern race-to-the-bottom theory in tax competition is that tax 
competition lowers government spending and tax revenues to inefficient levels (Rendon-
Garza, 2006). The empirical support for the theory was pioneered by Wilson (1986) and 
Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986) through theoretical model formulations based on Oates’s 
(1972) tax competition theory.  
The Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model also termed the ‘standard Z-M model of tax 
competition’ has a number of simplistic assumptions. Firstly, the model assumes a fixed 
number of homogeneous regions; secondly, it assumes that each region has an immobile 
factor of production labour and a mobile factor capital. The immobile capital is supplied 
by residents of the region and is inelastic in supply. The assumption of perfectly mobile 
capital implies that residents can choose to locate their capital wherever they want. The 
residents of each region have a fixed capital endowment. The model also assumes perfect 
competition in production and constant returns to scale technology. Due to fixed capital 
endowments in each region, adding the capital in all regions gives a fixed supply of capital 
in the world economy (Rendon-Garza, 2006). 
The Z-M model further assumes that the government seeks to achieve socially optimal 
mixes of public goods and taxation. The major conclusion of the model is that, given the 
fixed world economy capital, a rise in the capital tax rate in one region will increase the 
outflow of capital in that region due to the reduced returns on capital. The capital moving 
from the region with higher tax rates will move to the regions with lower tax rates and this 
is the basis of tax competition where regions compete for the limited world capital stock 
(Rendon-Garza, 2006). 
Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986) show that within a large number of jurisdictions 
competition leads to abandonment of property tax in all jurisdictions, thus all jurisdictions 
will rely on head taxes. As the number of jurisdictions increase it becomes difficult for a 
jurisdiction to influence the after-tax returns of investors. Eventually the Z-M model 
concludes that the tax competition will shift the tax burden to immobile factors of 
production Thus, any tax on mobile capital will be shifted to the immobile factor of 
production labour. 
Extensions of the standard Tax Competition Z-M Model 
Most of the models based on the standard tax competition Z-M model are based on 
relaxing the basic assumptions of the original model. 
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) were the initial theorists to extend the Z-M model. 
They argued that in real situations tax competition is among countries of different sizes so 
they relaxed the assumption on the size of the jurisdiction. Their conclusion was that given 
two countries with different sizes and equal per capita endowments, the smaller country is 
likely to lower tax rates to attract a greater proportion of internationally mobile capital and 
achieve a higher per capita utility level than the larger country. 
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Haufler & Wooton (1997; 1999) also relaxed the size of jurisdiction assumption and 
obtained different results from the Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). Wilson (1991) 
shows that given a large difference in the country sizes, tax competition is more preferable 
to a smaller nation since it reduces head taxes on individuals. Haufler and Wooton’s model 
extends the Z-M model and analyses tax competition between two countries of different 
sizes but adds trade costs and multiple tax instruments. They consider two taxes; profit-tax 
and consumption-tax. They conclude that, when regional countries have only a lump sum 
profit-tax at their disposal and face equal transport costs for imports, then both countries 
will always subsidise the business and the subsidy will be larger in the larger region than in 
the smaller region (Rendon-Garza, 2006).  The equilibrium outcome will be that firms 
locate to the larger markets paying profit-tax at an increasing rate with the market size. 
This illustrates that while tax competition may be generally bad it may benefit other 
countries. 
Kennan & Riezman (1988) analyse tax competition between countries in a model of tariff 
war between two countries. They model their analysis using Nash’s equilibrium in tariff 
rates and conclude that given large size differences between nations the large countries 
benefit more from tax competition. This is because the introduction of tariffs will change 
the terms of trade from the other country in an unfavourable way. Thus, this has its roots 
in the inter-regional externalities which will create favourable changes in terms of trade to 
large jurisdictions than to smaller ones (Wilson, 1999). 
Trade and tax competition 
Wilson (1987) launched the concept of trade in tax competition by introducing many   
countries in the analysis of tax competition. The model introduced two private goods, a 
capital intensive and a labour intensive good. Due to the concept of comparative 
advantage, the eventual effect of trade is that low tax rate regions will end up producing 
capital intensive goods and the high tax regions will produce labour intensive goods.  
This distorts the original comparative advantages structure between jurisdictions before 
the introduction of tax incentives which reduces the overall welfare of the trading 
partners, because production in capital intensive sectors is shifted to inefficient producers 
owing to lower tax rates. 
5.2 Tax harmonisation 
Tax harmonisation emerged to counter the effects of harmful tax competition (Gaigné & 
Riou, 2004). Tax harmonisation is defined as a process by which countries in the same 
economic region equalise their corporate income tax rates and standardise corporate tax 
bases (Bond, Chennells, Devereux, Gammie, & Troup, 2000). When countries do not 
adopt tax harmonisation strategies this leads to suboptimal taxation (Gaigné & Riou, 
2004). However, tax harmonisation removes the autonomy of a nation’s tax system and 
thus nations will be constrained in their use of fiscal policy to deal with economic shocks 
(Fourcans & Warin, 2001). 
Tax competition like every competitive market will lead to efficient tax systems which 
competing countries can use to better their tax administrations (Boss, 1999). 
Harmonisation can lead to an increase in the tax rates in a region and discourage 
innovation and growth in the tax system which may reduce FDI flows into a region. Lack 
of tax harmonisation has the following negative impact on economies: 
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Loss in revenue 
Tax incentives lead to loss in revenue through two channels. Firstly, tax competition 
lowers tax rates and thus reduces revenue and, secondly, companies in their tax planning 
strategies will seek to exploit opportunities presented by tax incentives to lower their tax 
burden through tax avoidance (Bond, Chennells, Devereux, Gammie, & Troup 2000). 
Change of economic behaviour 
The structure and operation of corporate income taxes can affect the operational decisions 
of firms on location, production, pricing and market conduct (Bond, Chennells, Devereux, 
Gammie, & Troup, 2000). Efficiency in production and economic integration and trade 
requires that production should take place in locations where an activity has comparative 
advantage over other locations. Thus use of taxes to influence location can lead to overall 
inefficiencies in production in the region.  
6. Empirical analyses on the effectiveness                                                               
of tax incentives in attracting FDI 
The theoretical analyses of tax incentives have opened a debate on whether tax incentives 
should be central in policies meant to attract FDI in the SADC. It is now important that 
the study turns to empirical findings on the effectiveness of tax incentives in achieving 
their objectives in attracting FDI and improving the economy’s competitiveness. 
Zee, Stotsky, & Ley (2002) argue that there is little evidence of the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in attracting FDI especially in developing countries. They questioned the 
importance of tax incentives in attracting FDI compared to non-tax factors that increase 
the attractiveness of an economy to FDI.  Beyer (2002) also finds no relationship between 
tax concessions and FDI attraction in transitional economies. While other studies such as 
Klemm & Van Parys (2012) find tax incentives to be vital to attracting FDI in low income 
countries. Van Parys & James (2010) also find tax concessions to have a positive impact in 
the Caribbean islands. 
6.1 Country-specific empirical studies 
Bolnick (2004) in a SADC technical report suggests that evidence from other developing 
nations including those in the SADC show that tax incentives are not enough to convince 
foreign investors to choose their locations. The study cites Mauritius, Costa Rica, Ireland 
and Malaysia as economies that have successfully used non-tax incentives to lure FDI. 
These countries implemented successful economic reforms, ensured political stability, 
educated their work-force, built good infrastructure and instituted investment promotions 
to increase their appeal to investors. 
Kransdorff (2010) in a study on the effectiveness of tax incentives on FDI attraction in 
South Africa concludes that taxation is important in attracting efficiency-seeking FDI. In 
the study Kransdorff reckons that given the effectiveness of taxation in attracting FDI, the 
low FDI flows in South Africa are due to a poor tax incentive structure. The study thus 
recommends that there is need for tax incentive regime reform in South Africa if the 
economy wishes to attract meaningful FDI. However, the study is qualitative and lacks 
quantitative proof to substantiate the arguments. It would be difficult to rely on 
Kransdorff’s study for policy reform so this is where the present study looks forward to 
filling in the quantitative gaps. 
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Tax incentives were also found to be effective in improving firm performance in Uganda 
(Mayende, 2013). Using firm level data in the manufacturing sector, the study concludes 
that tax incentives improve the firm’s ability to increase gross sales and value addition. The 
study thus recommends that tax incentives be used to increase firm performance. This 
positive impact of tax incentives on firm performance can be observed in the increase in 
the number of investors in an economy. However, the Tax Justice Network Africa & 
Action Aid International (2012) concludes that tax incentives in Uganda have led to 
harmful revenue losses. Tax Justice Network Africa & Action Aid International thus 
recommends that the Ugandan government remove tax incentives, especially tax holidays 
since they have led to harmful tax competition in the East African region. 
Miller, Webster, & Yanti (2013) in a study on the effects of indirect taxes on US inward 
FDI state that taxes are one of the determinants of FDI attraction in the US. Their study 
used a large sample of industries using gross operating surplus as a measure of indirect 
taxes. Using this unique tax measure the study analysed the composition of inward FDI in 
the US. The study concludes that the coefficient for indirect tax is both statistically 
significant and negative, indicating that higher indirect taxes reduce FDI flows into the US. 
6.2 Global empirical studies 
Klemm & Van Parys (2009) sought to establish the effectiveness of tax incentives in 
attracting FDI and whether tax incentives are used in competing for FDI. They used data 
on tax incentives from 40 Latin American, Caribbean and African countries for the period 
1985-2004. They applied panel econometric techniques in their study and concluded that 
lower tax rates are important in FDI attraction. Their use of spatial panel econometrics 
aided their second finding that tax holidays as well as lower corporate taxes are used in tax 
competition for FDI. 
Biggs (2007) surveyed twenty-one developing countries from across the world. The study 
concludes that given a well-structured tax policy, tax incentives can be effective in 
attracting foreign mobile capital. The study probes the fiscal regimes in developing 
countries and concludes that developing countries use the wrong tax incentives like tax 
holidays and accelerated depreciation which does not work in their economies. The study 
also recommends that policy makers focus their incentives on small domestic corporate 
players which are more responsive to incentives than large multinational corporations 
which require other non-tax incentives. 
Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, & Shleifer (2009) in partnership with 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers conducted a survey of 85 countries. The survey used effective 
corporate rates which were applied in 2004 for the sampled countries. It emerged that 
corporate tax rates have an adverse impact on gross investment, FDI and 
entrepreneurship. Corporate taxes were found to attract investment in the manufacturing 
sector but not in the services sector.  
These studies took data from countries across the globe which do not belong to a specific 
region. The conclusions show divergent views on the effectiveness of tax incentives on 
FDI attraction. This shows that effectiveness of tax incentives depends on the sampled 
economies. 
6.3 Regional empirical studies 
Chai & Goyal (2008) in a study to compare the benefits and the costs of tax concessions 
reckon that the cost of tax incentives is larger than the benefits. They used data from small 
island states in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. By comparing the costs of tax 
concessions (also termed tax incentives in terms of revenue lost and the benefits in the 
form of FDI attracted) they concluded that the region needed to move away from using 
tax concessions since they were found to be costly. 
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Šimović & Žaja (2010) performed a review of tax incentives used in Western Balkan 
countries, that is, in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The 
survey-based study concluded that like other transitional economies, the Western Balkan 
countries use tax incentives in under developed regions to attract investment and to 
develop the regions.  
Kinda (2014) used firm-level data from 30 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. The review 
revealed that infrastructure, human capital, and institutions, are influential in attracting 
FDI and taxes are not. Taxes were found to be ineffective in attracting both vertical FDI 
(that is export sector FDI) and horizontal FDI (where foreign firms will be producing for 
the host market). 
Van Parys & James (2010) did an enquiry into the effectiveness of tax incentives in twelve 
Western and Central African countries over the period 1994-2006. Using panel data 
econometrics, controlling for fixed effects, they found no robust positive relationship 
between tax holidays and investment attraction. 
Bellak & Leibrecht (2005) in a study on Central and East European Countries found that 
corporate tax rates were lowered in the region in a quest to attract international capital. 
Using panel data econometrics of 35 bilateral country relationships in the period 1995-
2002 the study revealed that the semi-elasticity tax rates on capital movement between 
trading countries was -2.93. This shows that lowering tax rates has been successful in 
attracting FDI in the region. 
These studies in different economic regions show that there is no solid conclusion on the 
effectiveness of tax incentives and results differ according to the regions and methodology 
used in the study. It is thus important that the SADC region’s data set be put to the test 
and results on the effectiveness of tax incentives in attraction of FDI in the region be 
produced to help policy makers. 
6.4 Methodological issues in regional studies 
Methodological issues have been significant in the kind of conclusions reached in the 
study of tax incentives for FDI (Sato, 2012). Country-specific studies are less effective 
since tax issues are mostly regional and most regions either use taxes for competition or 
for harmonisation. Regional studies which employ panel data econometrics apart from 
considering many economies in one model also have the theoretical power to separate 
effects of specific actions from more general policies (Hsiao 2003). Thus the effects of tax 
incentives and other incentive policies can be separated and bold conclusions can be 
drawn. 
Feld & Heckemeyer (2009) state that most economists have resorted to empirical studies 
to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of tax incentives on FDI attraction. They looked 
at the problem of heterogeneity in the study of taxation, especially the effects of factors 
such as public spending that may moderate the impact of tax differentials. The outcome of 
their study of European countries was that taxation is important in FDI locational 
decisions.  
It is thus imperative that every study that seeks to give instructive results affords careful 
consideration of the methodology to be used. Below is a summary of studies that looked 
at tax incentives for FDI attraction with a focus on regional studies. Emphasis will be on 
the effectiveness of the methodologies that were used. 
As noted by Klemm (2009) studies on the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI 
are limited especially in developing countries. The little work that exists is basically 
descriptive and qualitative in nature and based mainly on small sector case studies and thus 
is not reliable to use in policy formulation. This study’s econometric study of tax 
incentives and FDI attraction in the SADC thus goes a long way in establishing bold 
conclusions about the impact of taxation on investment in the broader developing world.  
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The major findings of this research are that while tax incentives are important in FDI 
attraction they work well with non-tax incentives. Developing nations should seek to 
develop economic infrastructure wish to attract any meaningful investment. Tax incentives 
are easy to implement thus most countries use them. However in the process they lose a 
lot of tax revenues. 
7. Summary and conclusion 
The research discussed the impact of tax incentives in attracting foreign mobile capital. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence shows that there is no clear conclusion on the 
effectiveness of tax incentives on FDI location; however, the results differ within the 
delimitation of the study.  
Most of the empirical studies that this study explored concluded that though tax incentives 
might be important in attracting FDI they are more effective when combined with other 
non-tax factors. Macroeconomic conditions, infrastructure and strong institutions were 
found to be important non-tax factors that improve the attractiveness of an economy to 
FDI. Recent empirical work found tax incentives to be effective in FDI attraction, given 
that with massive globalisation; locations are becoming more and more similar (Šimović & 
Žaja, 2010). Regional integration has necessitated harmonisation and coordination of 
economic policies in regional groupings such as the SADC, the European Union, 
ECOWAS and the African Union. The convergence in economic policies and economic 
growth has made regional countries perfect substitutes for investors, thus fiscal incentives 
are becoming increasingly important in competing for investment.  
The major weaknesses of using taxes in attracting FDI were discussed using the tax 
competition and tax harmonisation framework. Here it was noted that the use of tax 
incentives to attract FDI might improve the welfare of individuals in the jurisdiction that 
apply the incentives, but have external cost implications for residents in other competing 
jurisdictions that do not adopt tax incentives. Thus, tax incentives were seen to reduce the 
overall welfare of residents in a region. Tax harmonisation has thus dominated the order in 
regional integration economics, where regions seek to collectively lure internationally 
mobile capital. 
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Appendix 
TABLE 1.  SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON TAX INCENTIVES AND INVESTMENT                                           
AND ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF METHODOLOGIES USED 
AUTHOR FINDING METHODOLOGY 
USED 
ANALYSIS 
Hassett & 
Hubbard (2002) 
Using microeconomic data from 
firms they concluded that a 1% 
increase in user cost of capital 
lowers investment by between 
0.5% - 1%. Thus since taxes 
increase the user cost of capital, 
tax incentives lower the cost of 
capital and thus increase 
investment 
Microeconomic 
data 
The use of microeconomic data limited the study from 
including other locational characteristics which attract FDI such 
as macroeconomic environment, infrastructure and institutions. 
Thus, the result cannot be relied on for policy formulation. 
Sato (2012) Main conclusion was that 
current investment is influenced 
by previous year investment and 
taxes were found to negatively 
affect investment thus incentives 
help increase investment. 
Panel data The study used a panel of 30 OECD countries over the period 
1985-2007. The study used the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation of panel method recognising that 
current investments are affected by previous year investments 
and concentrated on macroeconomic variables as other 
determinants, ignoring effects of infrastructure and institutions. 
A long-panel series is also spurious thus panel unit roots could 
have improved the reliability of estimators. Testing for unit 
roots in panel data is important for assessing whether the first-
differenced GMM estimator is identified or other estimators 
need to be considered (Baltagi & Kao, 2000). 
Bolnick (2004) The study concludes that the 
costs of tax incentives are larger 
than benefits in the SADC. Tax 
incentives were also found to be 
more effective in some SADC 
countries than in others. Non-tax 
factors were found to be more 
effective than tax factors in FDI 
attraction in the SADC. 
Marginal 
effective tax 
calculations 
The study does not use quantitative econometrics analysis to 
draw conclusions on the effectiveness of non-tax incentives. 
Conclusions on tax incentives’ effectiveness were drawn using 
the marginal effective tax rate (METR) formula which does not 
capture fully the complexity of tax systems and the effect of 
non-tax factors. Onyeiwu & Shrestha (2005) argue that due to 
a variety of factors that influence FDI it is not practical to make 
deductions from a model that has tax incentives and FDI as 
the only variables. This study fills this gap by applying panel 
data econometric models which captures all theoretical factors 
that influence FDI in developing countries and addresses 
individual country’s tax effects. 
Sudsawasd 
(2008) 
The findings indicate that 
corporate income tax rates of 
East Asian countries do not 
have a significant impact on the 
level of FDI inflows from the 30 
OECD countries. 
Gravity model The analysis used the gravity model of investment between 
home and host nation and is limited in giving reliable 
conclusions on tax incentives since it relates tax systems 
between countries and ignores the impact of lowered tax rates 
on an individual firm’s decision to invest. 
Onyeiwu & 
Shrestha (2005) 
They conclude that tax 
incentives influence FDI flows 
into Middle Eastern and North 
African (MENA) countries and 
also found infrastructure, 
macroeconomic variables, 
institutional variables and 
government expenditures to be 
effective in FDI attraction. 
Panel data The study employed a fixed effects model. The model included 
important factors that improve the economic competitiveness 
of a country cited in various World Development Reports. The 
model has the shortcoming of ignoring the use of Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM), which works in a similar way to 
the Two Stage least squares in overcoming problems of 
endogeneity (Baltagi & Kao, 2000). However, most of the 
variables were used in this study’s model since the SADC 
region has similar growth characteristics to the MENA region. 
 
